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I. Introduction
Although the inherent tension between technological development and
individual privacy has long been a familiar source of legal conflict, the
passage of time has intensified, rather than alleviated, this tension. Justice
Brandeis, writing over eighty years ago in dissent in Olmstead v. United
States,' correctly predicted the progressive exacerbation of this tension,
noting his expectation that the continued growth of electronic surveillance
ultimately would undermine the protection of individual privacy:
"[T]ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes." Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the Government. Discovery and invention have
made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet.2
Since then, this prediction has been vindicated-law enforcement agencies
have continued to develop and take advantage of new technologies to assist
their investigations, resulting in more intrusive invasions upon individual
privacy.3 One of the most prevalent modem incarnations of this phenomenon
is the availability and use of cell site location information (CSLI).
1. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (finding no Fourth
Amendment search in the government's installation of a wiretap device on the phone line
outside of the defendant's residence because there was no physical trespass upon the
defendant's property), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,29-30 (2001) (discussing police use of
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CSLI derives from the process by which cellular phones communicate
with nearby service towers.4 This process occurs continuously while a phone is
turned on5 and without any action on the part of the phone's user.6 From this
process, cellular service providers (CSPs) receive details regarding the tower
locations relied upon by users, which in turn can provide a relatively detailed
picture of those users' geographic whereabouts.7
CSLI has an enormous investigative utility for law enforcement agencies.8
Given the level of detail that such information contains, CSLI functionally
provides the government with the ability to track suspects.9 To capitalize on
the availability of this potent tool, federal law enforcement officials more
frequently have begun to seek court orders to compel CSPs to disclose
particular users' CSLI.10 Law enforcement applications for court orders in this
thermal imaging devices to detect amounts of heat within a residence); United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983) (describing tracking beepers as "radio transmitter[s] .. .which emit[]
periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver," thereby allowing the tracking of
individuals and objects); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979) (discussing law
enforcement use of"pen registers," which "record[] the numbers dialed on a telephone" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
4. See Kevin McLaughlin, Note, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location
Tracking: Where are We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 426 (2007) (describing the
process of "registration," in which cellular phones "relay their locations to cellular towers").
5. See id. (stating that the registration process "occurs roughly every seven seconds when
the cell phone is turned on").
6. Id.; see also Stephanie Lockwood, Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy
Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
307, 309 (2004) ("Even when users are not making or receiving calls, cell phones communicate
with the nearest cell tower to register.").
7. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 426 (stating that a single tower location, if located
in an urban area, may provide a user's location to within a few hundred feet). An even more
precise location can be gained by using triangulation, which employs data from three tower
locations. Id. at 427. For a more in-depth discussion of the technology of CSLI, see infra Part
II.
8. See, e.g., Lockwood, supra note 6, at 310-11 (providing examples of cases in which
police used CSLI to help break their cases, and, in some instances, save lives); see also M.
Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2007)
(describing one advantage of CSLI as the fact that so many people carry cell phones, thus
providing agents with the ability to track more than objects or certain limited classes of people).
9. See Lockwood, supra note 6, at 309 (stating that one's "signal can move between
different cell towers or faces on a single tower, creating a virtual map of [one's] movements").
10. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or
Cell Site Info. (Orenstein), 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (addressing the
government's application for cell site information at the origination and termination of calls as
well as during the calls); In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell
Site Location Auth. (Smith), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (same). As of August
1, 2009, a total of thirty-one available district court decisions have addressed law enforcement
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context can be classified as historical, prospective, or both. ' A prospective
order is sought when law enforcement officials wish to obtain CSLI "as it
happens in real time. 12 This variety of data is commonly referred to as "real-
time" CSLI. 13 In the alternative, law enforcement officials may opt to try to
compel disclosure of historical CSLI, which service providers maintain in their
stored records. 14 Historical CSLI allows the government to learn about a
suspect's past and often relatively recent whereabouts.' 5
To date, the vast majority of caselaw in this area has addressed law
enforcement applications seeking to compel disclosure of real-time CSLI.'6
This jurisprudential disparity is not surprising in light of the higher
investigative utility of real-time CSLI-agents obviously prefer a tool that
allows them to remain on top of their suspect's every move to one that leaves
them several steps behind that suspect. 17 Despite numerous attempts to obtain
real-time CSLI and creative statutory argumentation by government attorneys,
law enforcement efforts in this area have been largely unsuccessfull 8-the
consensus among courts is that the government cannot obtain real-time CSLI
absent probable cause, and generally, the government has not been prepared to
satisfy this quantum of proof.' 9
applications for CSLI. Because many law enforcement applications for CSLI and corresponding
judicial decisions are sealed, the real number is likely significantly higher.
11. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 431-33 (discussing the distinction between
prospective and historical applications for CSLI).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Smith, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 748-49 (using the terms "prospective" and "real-
time" interchangeably in defining the issue in the case).
14. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 431 (describing historical CSLI applications as law
enforcement attempts to "go through the retained records of the service provider").
15. See id. (defining the government's goal in historical CSLI applications as
"reconstruct[ing] a picture of where a suspect was at a given time in the past").
16. As of August 1, 2009, a total of thirty-one available decisions have addressed law
enforcement applications for CSLI. Of these, three involved applications for historical CSLI
alone, twenty-five involved applications for real-time CSLI alone, and three involved
applications for both. In all subsequent footnotes providing figures on the numbers of certain
types of CSLI cases, the figures are current as of August 1, 2009.
17. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing real-time CSLI as providing law
enforcement with location information as it becomes known).
18. See infra Part III.C (discussing the widespread rejection of law enforcement
applications for real-time CSLI, including courts' rejection of the government's "hybrid
theory").
19. Of the twenty-eight total decisions to address the proper standard for real-time CSLI,
twenty have held the proper standard to be probable cause. Compare In re Application of the
U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device and
(2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info. (Orenstein), 396 F. Supp. 2d
294, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (requiring a showing of probable cause to compel disclosure of real-
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This Note addresses a question that for the most part has been overlooked
in CSLI jurisprudence and literature: What level of suspicion must federal law
enforcement officials establish to obtain a court order to compel the disclosure
of historical cell phone location information? To date, only a handful of courts
have confronted this question directly,20 and, of those that have, almost all have
required satisfaction of the lesser quantum of proof contained in the Stored
Communications Act (SCA).2 1 Several other courts, faced with applications for
time CSLI), and In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Auth. (Smith), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (same), with In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain
Cellular Tel. (Kaplan), 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (requiring that the
government satisfy the "specific and articulable facts" standard provided in the Stored
Communications Act to compel disclosure of real-time CSLI). For a more detailed discussion
of real-time CSLI jurisprudence, see infra Part III.C.
20. A total of six cases in five districts directly have addressed the proper standard for the
disclosure of historical CSLI. See United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-
MHS/AJB, 2008 WL 4200156, at *1-2 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (addressing the defendants'
motion to suppress historical CSLI evidence that had been ordered disclosed by the magistrate
judge under the SCA standard); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider
of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't (Lenihan), 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 588
(W.D. Pa. 2008) (addressing a government application for historical CSLI), aff'd, 2008 WL
4191511 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2008); In re Applications of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing
Continued Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace with Caller Identification Device and Cell
Site Location Auth. (Alexander II), 530 F. Supp. 2d 367, 368 (D. Mass. 2007) (addressing a
government application for both historical and real-time CSLI); In re Application of the U.S. for
an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info. (Rosenthal), 622 F. Supp. 2d
411, 412-14 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (same); In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to
Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. and Historical Cell Site Info.
(Alexander I), 509 F. Supp. 2d 64, 66 (D. Mass. 2007) (addressing a government application for
historical CSLI), rev'd, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007); In re Application of the U.S. for an
Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device;
(2) Authorizing the Release of Subscriber and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of
Location-Based Servs. (Lee), No. 1:06-MC-6, 2006 WL 1876847, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2006)
(addressing separate government applications for historical and real-time CSLI).
21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2006). The SCA permits disclosure of"record[s] or other
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [an electronic communication or remote
computing] service," id. § 2703(c)(1), upon a governmental showing of"specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the. .. records or other
information sought[] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation," id.
§ 2703(d). Most courts faced with applications for disclosure of historical CSLI have applied
the SCA standard. See United States v. Suarez-Blanca, No. 1:07-CR-0023-MHS/AJB, 2008
WL 4200156, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21,2008) (denying the defendants' motion to suppress by
accepting the magistrate judge's order disclosing historical CSLI based on the SCA standard);
In re Applications of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Continued Use of a Pen Register and
Trap and Trace with Caller Identification Device and Cell Site Location Auth. (Alexander II),
530 F. Supp. 2d 367, 368 (D. Mass. 2007) (allowing the disclosure of historical CSLI under the
SCA standard); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and
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real-time CSLI, have agreed, stating in dicta that disclosure of historical CSLI
is held to the SCA standard.22 Taken together, these cases represent the
proposition that historical CSLI is different from real-time CSLI in a material
way-namely, that the act of storing location information somehow means that
the disclosure of such information is not entitled to the same level of judicial
oversight. Until recently, this proposition stood unchallenged.23
A recent decision by a United States Magistrate Judge in Pennsylvania,
however, has defied this understanding, thereby reanimating what appeared to
24be a dead issue. In a thorough opinion, Judge Lenihan of the Western District
of Pennsylvania held that the disclosure of historical CSLI is governed not by
the "specific and articulable facts" standard of the SCA,25 but by the traditional
requirement of probable cause.26 Unlike the lone other magistrate judge
Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber
and Other Info. (Rosenthal), 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (same); In re
Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d) (Steams),
509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D. Mass. 2007) (same).
22. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of
a Pen Register and/or Trap and Trace and the Disclosure of Subscriber and Activity Info. Under
18 U.S.C. § 2703, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211,214 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that the SCA allows the
government to obtain historical CSLI at its lower standard); Smith, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 759 n. 16
("[H]istorical cell site data more comfortably fits the category of transactional records covered
by [and held to a lower standard by] the SCA."); Orenstein, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 307 n.10 ("I
have no doubt that the SCA authorizes a service provider's disclosure to law enforcement of
historical cell site information .... ).
23. But see In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) Authorizing the Release of Subscriber
and Other Info.; and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Based Servs. (Lee), No. 1:06-
MC-6, 2006 WL 1876847, at *5 (N.D. Ind. July 5,2006) (rejecting the government's request for
an order compelling the disclosure of both historical and real-time CSLI, finding that probable
cause is required for both). Though this decision held that historical CSLI cannot be disclosed
absent probable cause, its holding as to historical CSLI cannot be taken literally because it was
based upon an analysis that conflated the two categories (historical and real-time) into one
without explanation. See id. at *I ("Either way, the Government [requests] an order requiring
cellular phone companies to identify the specific cell tower from which a call originates, is
maintained, or received for an incoming or outgoing call.... [T]his Court agrees... that such
information is unobtainable absent a warrant."). More importantly, the court's opinion focused
exclusively on real-time CSLI with almost no mention of historical data, suggesting that the
holding as to historical CSLI was simply an afterthought.
24. See Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 586 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (holding, in a case involving
an application to compel disclosure of historical CSLI, that the government could not obtain
such information absent a showing of probable cause).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) (requiring the government to establish "specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the.., records or
other information sought[] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation").
26. See Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 587 ("[T]his Court holds that the SCA... does not
authorize access to an individual's cell-phone-derived 'location information,' either past or
1750
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decision reaching this conclusion, 2 Judge Lenihan's decision was affirmed by
the reviewing district court judge.28
Judge Lenihan's decision and the question it revives-whether disclosure
of historical CSLI is governed by probable cause or some lesser standard-are
significant for several reasons. Law enforcement attempts to obtain real-time
CSLI have been, for the most part, unsuccessful. 29 Given the incredibly high
investigative utility of CSLI,30 however, it is unlikely that the failure to obtain
real-time CSLI will deter law enforcement officials from pursuing cell phone
location data. The more likely outcome is that federal agents more frequently
will attempt to obtain historical CSLI because old location information
certainly is more useful than having no location information at all. As a result,
the question of what standard governs the disclosure of historical CSLI likely
will become increasingly important in the years to come.31
In addition, the novelty of Judge Lenihan's decision suggests that it may
influence how future courts address applications requesting historical CSLI.
Although several courts have found (either explicitly or in dicta) that historical
CSLI is held to a lower standard because it is materially distinguishable from
real-time CSLI,32 Judge Lenihan's decision provides the first substantive
defense of the opposing argument. According to this view, the arguments that
prospective, on a simple showing of articulable relevance to an ongoing investigation (a
,reasonable relevance' standard).").
27. See In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section
2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. and Historical Cell Site Info. (Alexander I), 509 F. Supp.
2d 64, 66 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding that historical CSLI cannot be disclosed to law enforcement
agents in the absence of probable cause). Judge Alexander's decision was reversed on review
by the district court. See In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S.
Code, Section 2703(d) (Steams), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81-82 (D. Mass. 2007) (granting the
government's application for the disclosure of historical CSLI at the SCA's lesser standard).
28. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n
Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov't, No. 07-524M, 2008 WL 4191511, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept.
10, 2008) (affirming the decision of Magistrate Judge Lenihan that required a showing of
probable cause to compel the disclosure of historical CSLI).
29. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (noting that the vast majority of courts
have required probable cause to compel disclosure of real-time CSLI and that, in practice, this
usually has meant the rejection of law enforcement applications for real-time CSLI).
30. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (describing the ways in which CSLI can
aid in law enforcement investigations, including its usefulness in tracking suspects).
31. In fact, the Department of Justice views the issue as so important that it has appealed
Judge Lenihan's ruling and the district court decision affirming it. As of August 1,2009, that
appeal remains pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
32. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (citing to cases that have said, either
explicitly or in dicta, that the SCA's lesser standard governs the disclosure of historical CSLI).
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require real-time CSLI to be protected by a probable cause standard apply with
equal force to historical CSLI.33
This Note defends the view put forth in Judge Lenihan's opinion, arguing
that historical CSLI, like real-time CSLI, cannot be disclosed absent a showing
of probable cause. Through a detailed analysis of the relevant arguments,
including but not limited to those asserted in Judge Lenihan's opinion, it sets
forth to debunk the seemingly widely accepted view that stored cell phone
location data is entitled to reduced statutory and constitutional protection. In
furtherance of this objective, Part II of this Note begins with a brief explanation
of the technology that produces CSLI. Part III provides an overview of the
legal framework governing the disclosure of CSLI, including federal statutes,
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and real-time CSLIjurisprudence. Part IV
of the Note then addresses the arguments for and against the adoption of a
probable cause standard for the disclosure of historical CSLI. More
specifically, it compartmentalizes the broader arguments into smaller points of
contention, addressing the perspectives of both sides of the debate through this
narrower lens. Part V suggests that congressional intervention is needed to
resolve this dispute and proposes specific legislation designed to govern
judicially-compelled disclosure of CSLI. Finally, on the basis of the arguments
presented in Part IV, Part VI of this Note concludes that federal courts cannot
compel disclosure of historical CSLI in the absence of probable cause.
II. The Technology of Cell Site Location Information
The legal arguments surrounding CSLI disclosure are premised upon an
understanding of the technology that produces such information. Accordingly,
a brief technological overview is necessary. The first step in the process that
produces CSLI is "registration," the procedure in which a cell phone
communicates its location to nearby cellular towers.34 Registration occurs
approximately every seven seconds while a cell phone is turned on and requires
no action on the part of the user.35 Given the automatic nature of the
33. See Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 601 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (rejecting the argument that
the relevant statutes and jurisprudence mandate a distinction between real-time and historical
CSLI).
34. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 426 (describing the registration process as one in
which "[c]ell phones constantly relay their locations to cellular towers").
35. See id. ("This process, called 'registration,' occurs roughly every seven seconds when
the cell phone is turned on; the user of the phone does not need to take any action.. ").
1752
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registration process, the only way to prevent a phone from conveying location
information is to turn the phone off.
36
As a user moves farther from one cellular tower and closer to another, thereby
decreasing signal strength at the first tower while increasing it at the second, her
phone will re-register at the nearer tower to ensure the strongest possible signal for
sending and receiving calls and messages. 37 In many instances, monitoring these
tower switches alone makes it possible to map the movements of particular cell
phones, and, consequently, their users.38 "When two or more towers receive signals
from the same phone," however, allowing for a comparative assessment of signal
strength, two more precise methods for determining a cell phone's location become
available: Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) and Angle of Arrival (AOA).39
TDOA approximates a cell phone's location by measuring the amount of time
it takes a signal to travel from the phone to the tower or from the tower to the phone,
depending on where the communication is initiated.40  From such time
measurements, it is possible "to estimate the distance between the tower and the
phone.",41 When TDOA data is available from multiple towers, CSPs can calculate
a phone's latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates.42 AOA technology, by contrast,
determines a phone's location based on the angle at which its signal reaches the
tower.43 "When multiple towers receive signals, [CSPs] can compare the angles of
arrival and thus [ascertain] the relative location of the cell phone."" When TDOA
or AOA data is available from the three towers nearest to the cellular device-a
possibility referred to as "triangulation"--CSPs are able to provide their most
detailed portrayal of a cell phone user's whereabouts.
45
Monitoring the location of a cellular device-regardless of the method used to
approximate that location-allows authorities to pinpoint a user's whereabouts with
36. See id. ("The only way to stop these signals is to turn the phone off.").
37. See id. (describing the process by which towers continually measure signal strength
and by which cell phones switch frequencies to obtain a signal from a closer tower); Lockwood,
supra note 6, at 309 ("If a user has moved to another cell location, the unit re-registers there.").
38. See, e.g., Lockwood, supra note 6, at 309 (noting that when a signal moves between
different cell towers or between faces of a particular tower, the location information produced
can "creat[e] a virtual map of [a user's] movements").
39. See id. at 308 (introducing the two processes by which cellular phone towers can
approximate cellular phone location).
40. Id. at 308-09.
41. Id. at 309.
42. See id. ("When more than one tower can do so, an algorithm allows the system to
determine coordinates corresponding to the phone's latitude and longitude.").
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 427.
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incredible detail. "In urban areas, where towers have become increasingly
concentrated, tracking the location of just the nearest tower itself can place the
phone within approximately 200 feet. This location range can be narrowed by
'tracking which 120 degree face of the tower is receiving a cell phone's signal.'0
6
From there, an even more specific location can be determined by triangulating data
from the three towers nearest to the device.47 In rural areas, CSLI provides
significantly less detail because there are fewer cellular towers and because the
towers that do exist are too spread out to pinpoint a phone's location with much
48accuracy. In any event, the startling level of precision with which CSLI can be
used to identify users' locations-and, over time, to map a history of users'
movements-makes clear that such information represents a considerable invasion
upon individual privacy.
III. The Law Governing the Disclosure of CSLI
This Part discusses the relevant background law that governs law enforcement
applications for the disclosure of CSLI. Part IL.A begins with a description of the
applicable federal statutory framework. Part IlI.B discusses pertinent Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, including the Supreme Court's assumption of the risk
and tracking beeper cases. Part 1m.C concludes with a summary of the case law on
applications for real-time CSLI, noting that district courts have widely held that such
data cannot be disclosed absent a governmental showing of probable cause.
A. Statutory Framework
1. The Pen Register Statute
Title HI of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),
commonly referred to as the Pen Register Statute (PRS), 49 applies to law
46. Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585,590 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting McLaughlin, supra note
4, at 427).
47. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 427 ("A more accurate picture of a phone's location
[than that provided by simply knowing the nearest cellular tower] may be generated by using
triangulation....").
48. See id. at 426 ("In rural areas, towers may be miles apart."); Lockwood, supra note 6,
at 309 ("In rural settings, the location information available to providers is significantly less
accurate simply because fewer towers are available. In some areas, cell service is provided by a
single tower covering several hundred square miles.").




enforcement applications for two forms of telephone-based surveillance: pen
registers and trap and trace devices.5 ° Judge Lenihan aptly summarized each of
these surveillance devices, including their critical difference:
[A] "Pen Register" is a device which records or decodes electronic or other
impulses which identify the telephone numbers dialed or otherwise
transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached (i.e., the
numbers of outgoing calls). A trap and trace device captures the incoming
electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number of an
instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was
transmitted (i.e., the numbers of incoming calls).51
Under the PRS, the government must obtain a court order before installing a
pen register or a trap and trace device on a suspect's phone.52 Despite this
prohibition, the PRS sets a low bar for obtaining such an order: The court
merely must find, upon certification by a government attorney, "that the
information likely to be obtained by [installing and using the device] is relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation. 53 Court orders allowing the use of pen
registers and trap and trace devices are limited in duration-they cannot exceed
sixty days-but may be extended in the event of an additional application by
the government.54
2. The Stored Communications Act
The Stored Communications Act, which constitutes Title II of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 55 regulates the disclosure of
stored wire and electronic communications information.56 The SCA divides
50. See, e.g., id. § 3121(a) (providing general prohibition on the installation and use of
pen registers or trap and trace devices without a court order).
51. Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 593. Accord In re Application for Pen Register and
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth. (Smith), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 752 (S.D. Tex.
2005) ("A 'pen register' is a device that records the numbers dialed for outgoing calls made
from the target phone. A trap and trace device captures the numbers of calls made to the target
phone.").
52. See § 3121 (a) ("Except as provided in this section, no person may install or use a pen
register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order... .
53. Id. § 3123(a)(1).
54. See id. § 3123(c) (defining the temporal limit for court orders that allow for the
installation of pen registers or trap and trace devices and providing a provision for extending
orders beyond that limit).
55. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 201, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711
(2006).
56. See, e.g., id. § 2701(a) (providing general criminal prohibition on unauthorized access
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communications information sought by the government into two mutually
exclusive categories: the contents of communications 57 and "record[s] or other
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [an electronic
communication or remote computing] service (not including the contents of
communications)."5 8 More importantly, it dictates the steps the government
must take to compel the disclosure of each of these varieties of information. 59
Because CSLI does not constitute the contents of communications, the portion
of the SCA relevant to its disclosure is that which addresses disclosure of
"record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [an
electronic communication or remote computing] service."
Section 2703(c) provides the guidelines for compelled disclosure of
"record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [an
electronic communication or remote computing] service., 60  Aside from
governmental requests for the disclosure of certain specified pieces of
information 61 and for information "relevant to a law enforcement investigation
concerning telemarketing fraud,, 62 § 2703(c) provides the government with
three routes to compelled disclosure.63 First, law enforcement agents can obtain
a warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.64 Alternatively, the
government may obtain "the consent of the subscriber or customer to such
to stored wire or electronic communications); id. § 2703 (referring only to wire and electronic
communications in delineating the Act's disclosure rules).
57. See id. §§ 2703(a)-(b) (providing the requirements the government must satisfy to
compel disclosure of contents of electronic communications information held in electronic
storage and remote computing services, respectively).
58. Id. § 2703(c).
59. See id. §§ 2703(a)-(c) (delineating the requirements for compelled disclosure of
electronic communications information in three specific instances); id. § 2703(d) (providing a
different requirement for the disclosure of information falling under specified portions of
subsections (b) and (c)).
60. Id. § 2703(c).
61. See id. § 2703(c)(2) (requiring service providers to disclose to the government the
name, address, telephone records, length of service, telephone number, and source of payment if
demanded by the appropriate form of subpoena).
62. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(D).
63. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (describing the three means of
disclosure under § 2703(c): obtaining a warrant, satisfying § 2703(d), and procuring the
consent of the subscriber or customer).
64. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) (2006) (permitting disclosure of a "record or other
information pertaining to a subscriber" if the government obtains a warrant). Under the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the general rule is that warrants will not be issued absent probable
cause. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(l) ("[A] magistratejudge... must issue [a] warrant if there is
probable cause to search for.., a person or property or to install and use a tracking device.").
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disclosure., 65  Finally, it may compel disclosure of "record[s] or other
information pertaining to a subscriber" if it receives a court order under
§ 2703(d).66 Section 2703(d), in tum, provides:
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c)... shall issue only
if the governmental entity offers specific and articulablefacts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or
electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
67
The § 2703(d) standard is demonstrably less stringent than the warrant
requirement imposed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and, by
extension, § 2703(c)(1)(A). 68 That, coupled with the fact that no reasonable
law enforcement official would sacrifice the element of surprise in her
surveillance by seeking a suspect's consent for disclosure, leads to an intuitive
three-step approach for law enforcement agents seeking CSLI: (1) argue that
the SCA applies to CSLI; (2) argue that CSLI qualifies under § 2703(c) as "a
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber;" and (3) assert that CSLI
therefore can be disclosed under the less stringent § 2703(d) standard. In fact,
69this is a major part of the argument relied upon by the government.
As previously mentioned, the SCA only applies to the disclosure of wire
or electronic communications. 70 Because cellular communications, and thus
CSLI, clearly are not a form of wire communication, 71 the SCA can govern the
disclosure of CSLI only if cellular communications can be classified as a form
of "electronic communication." Although cellular communications appear to
fall within the positive definition of "electronic communication, 7 2 the
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C).
66. Id. §2703(c)(1)(B).
67. Id. § 2703(d) (emphasis added).
68. Compare id. (requiring "specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a... communication... or other information
sought[] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation"), with FED. R. CRIM. P.
41 (d)(1) (requiring probable cause).
69. See infra Part III.C (discussing in greater detail the legal arguments made by the
government in cases in which it sought to compel the disclosure of real-time CSLI).
70. See supra note 56 (providing examples of provisions in the SCA that illustrate that the
Act's scope is limited to wire and electronic communications).
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006) (defining the term "wire communication" as "any
aural transfer made in whole or in part... by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection
between the point of origin and the point of reception" (emphasis added)).
72. See id. § 2510(12) (defining the term "electronic communication" to include "any
transfer of... sounds[] [or] data... transmitted in whole or in part by a... radio,
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system").
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definition also contains a negative component that excludes from its reach "any
communication from a tracking device. 73 The term "tracking device" is
defined as "an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of
the movement of a person or object."74 In other words, the government may not
rely on the SCA to compel disclosure of non-wire forms of communication that
derive from devices that can be used to determine the movements of their users.
For obvious reasons, opponents of CSLI-based surveillance have placed
significant emphasis on this exception.75
3. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
In 1994, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA),7 6 legislation that requires "telecommunications
carrier[s] [to] ensure that [their] equipment, facilities, or services that provide a
customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct
communications are capable of,"7 7 among other things:
[E]xpeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court
order or other lawful authorization, to access call-identifying information
that is reasonably available to the carrier (A) before, during, or immediately
after the transmission of a wire or electronic communication (or at such
later time as may be acceptable to the government); and (B) in a manner
that allows it to be associated with the communication to which it
pertains.
78
More importantly for purposes of CSLI disclosure, this requirement is subject
to an exception; telecommunications carriers must be capable of providing the
information described above, but with one limitation:
[W]ith regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for
pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127 of title
18), such call-identifying information shall not include any information
73. Id. § 2510(12)(C).
74. Id. § 3117(b) (emphasis added).
75. See infra Part IV.A.I.a (setting forth the arguments for and against applying the
tracking device exception to historical CSLI).
76. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act §§ 102-112, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1010 (2000).
77. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a).
78. Id. § 1002(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the
extent that the location may be determined from the telephone number).79
The CALEA defines the term "call-identifying information" as "dialing or
signaling information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or
termination of each communication generated or received by a subscriber by
means of any ... telecommunications carrier. 80  Because the terms "wire
communication" and "electronic communication" are defined in the same way
under the CALEA as they are under the SCA,81 communications from devices
that can be used to track an individual's movements are not "electronic
communications" under the CALEA .
The legislative history surrounding the CALEA's exception for
information that reveals a user's location is among the many contentious issues
in CSLI scholarship and jurisprudence.83 In enacting the CALEA, Congress's
objective was to balance its interest in aiding effective law enforcement with its
interest in "protect[ing] privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and
personally revealing technologies., 84 This privacy interest ultimately proved to
be paramount to Congress, as legislators expressed grave concerns that the
enactment of the CALEA would change the "background requirements"
governing disclosure of sensitive telecommunications information and would
"later [be] asserted to have affected the judicial review protections applicable
to" such information. 85 These fears were allayed by the testimony of then-FBI
Director Louis Freeh, who appeared before both the Senate and the House of
Representatives to testify regarding how law enforcement officials understood
and intended to apply the Act.86 First, Director Freeh told Congress that the
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. § 1001(2).
81. See id. § 1001(1) ("The terms defined in [18 U.S.C. § 2510] have, respectively, the
meanings stated in that section."). "Wire communication" and "electronic communication" are
each defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(1), 2510(12) (2006). Like the CALEA,
the SCA relies upon the § 2510 definitions. See id. § 2711(1) ("[T]he terms defined in [18
U.S.C. § 2510] have, respectively, the definitions given such terms in that section.").
82. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (explaining the tracking device
exception).
83. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the debate regarding how the CALEA, and
particularly its legislative history, should be understood).
84. H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 13 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3493. In
addition to its interest in protecting privacy, Congress defined its other two interests as
"preserv[ing] a narrowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out properly
authorized intercepts," and "avoid[ing] impeding the development of new communications
services and technologies." Id.
85. Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
86. See id. (describing Director Freeh's participation as involving "lengthy and repeated
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CALEA was not intended to make it possible for law enforcement agents to
obtain location information or to otherwise expand the government's then-
existing authority to obtain private telecommunications information.87 Freeh
also declared that law enforcement officials had "no intent whatsoever ... to
acquire anything [under the CALEA] that could properly be called 'tracking'
information. 8 Most importantly, Director Freeh recommended that Congress
add an exception to what is now § 1002(a)(2) for information revealing a
subscriber's location, noting that such an exception would alleviate any
concerns that pen registers, trap and traces, and similar devices could be used to
acquire location or movement information.89 As indicated above, Congress
followed this suggestion and excluded from the CALEA's requirements the
disclosure of any location-identifying information.9"
B. Relevant Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
1. The Fourth Amendment Definition of "Search"
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 91 As the text of the
Amendment indicates, the Fourth Amendment applies only when a
governmental action can be classified as either a "search" or a "seizure.
9 2
Justice Harlan provided the classic definition of "search" in his concurrence in
testimony before [both] the Senate and House").
87. See id. (asserting that Freeh "reassured Congress" that "the proposed legislation would
'ensure[] the maintenance of the status quo"' (quoting Joint Hearing on Digital Telephony and
Law Enforcement Access to Advanced Telecomms. Techs. and Servs.: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Tech. and Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 2, 28 (1994) [hereinafter
CALEA Joint Hearings] (statement of Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation))).
88. Id. (quoting CALEA Joint Hearings, supra note 87, at 23 (statement of Louis Freeh,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)).
89. See id. at 597 (noting that Director Freeh represented that law enforcement officials
were comfortable with adding the exception now codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (citing
CALEA Joint Hearings, supra note 87, at 29 (statement of Louis Freeh, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation))).
90. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the CALEA's limitation on the
disclosure of location-identifying information obtained solely pursuant to the PRS).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.




the judgment in Katz v. United States:93 "[T]here is a twofold requirement, first
that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."' 94 If either prong of the test fails-if the asserted expectation of
privacy either could not have been subjectively held by the individual alleging a
search or is an expectation that society would not view as reasonable-then no
search has taken place and the Fourth Amendment is not implicated.95
2. Assumption of the Risk
In United States v. Miller,96 the Supreme Court addressed whether a
bank's disclosure of a customer's records, when compelled by the government,
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.97 In Miller, the government
used subpoenas to compel two banks to disclose all records of accounts in the
defendant's name during a particular time period.98 Although the defendant
argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal records
he provided to the banks, 99 the Court disagreed. 00 The Court first noted that
the documents disclosed by the bank could not be deemed the defendant's
"private papers."' 0' It then explained why it found no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the information in question, which the bank had obtained only
because the defendant had supplied it: "All of the documents obtained,
93. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 359 (1967) (concluding that the
government's placing of a wiretap on a public phone booth to record the contents of the
defendant's phone call constituted a search, and finding that the government's failure to obtain
judicial authorization prior to engaging in that search violated the Fourth Amendment).
94. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
95. See id. (defining the term "search" to encompass two requirements, each of which
must be met to trigger the protection of the Fourth Amendment).
96. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443-44 (1976) (finding that individuals
possess no expectation of privacy in financial information they voluntarily supply to banks
because they risk "that [such] information will be conveyed by [banks] to the Government").
97. See id. at 439-40 (noting and accepting the government's argument that the defendant
had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his bank records).
98. See id. at 437-38 (discussing the bank records obtained by the government in the
case).
99. See id. at 442 ("Respondent urges that he has a Fourth Amendment interest in the
records kept by the banks because they are merely copies of personal records that were made
available to the banks for a limited purpose and in which he has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.").
100. Id. ("[W]e perceive no legitimate 'expectation of privacy' in their contents.").
101. Id. at 440 ("On their face, the documents subpoenaed here are not respondent's
'private papers."').
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including financial statements and deposit slips, contain only information
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the
ordinary course of business." 10 2  The Court then took the added step of
couching its holding in terms of assumption of the risk:
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. This
Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by [that
third party] to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
Because the Court found that the defendant lacked a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the information he provided to the banks, it concluded that no search
had taken place and that, therefore, the defendant "possessed no Fourth
Amendment interest." 104
The Court reached a similar outcome in Smith v. Maryland,10 5 a case that
addressed "the question whether the installation and use of a pen register
constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."' 1 6 As
noted above, a pen register is a device that records the numbers dialed from a
particular phone.'0 7 The Court in Smith described pen registers as minimally
intrusive in that they acquire only the numbers dialed from particular phones-
not the contents of the communications emanating from those phones.10 8 In
light of this limitation, the Court characterized the defendant's Fourth
Amendment argument as a simple "claim that he had a 'legitimate expectation
of privacy' regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone."'09
The Smith Court rejected this claim. First, it found that people are
unlikely to have any subjective expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial:
102. Id. at 442.
103. Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 445.
105. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (concluding that "[t]he
installation and use of a pen register. . . was not a 'search"' because the defendant lacked any
reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed).
106. Id. at 736.
107. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (defining the term "pen register").
108. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 ("These devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the
telephone numbers that have been dialed .... Neither the purport of any communication
between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even
completed is disclosed by pen registers." (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S.
159, 167 (1977))).
109. Id. at 742.
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"Telephone users... typically know that they must convey numerical
information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for
recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this
information... .,11 Second, the Court declared that even if the defendant had
an actual expectation of privacy, his expectation could not be deemed
reasonable because of the assumption of the risk doctrine."' Referring to the
analogous situation in Miller, the Court stated:
This analysis dictates that petitioner can claim no legitimate expectation of
privacy here. When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and "exposed" that
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so
doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police
the numbers he dialed. 1
2
Based on this rationale, the Smith Court concluded that the installation and use
of a pen register does not constitute a "search" for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. 1
13
3. The Tracking Beeper Cases
The Supreme Court addressed the Fourth Amendment legality of law
enforcement use of tracking beepers in a pair of cases decided only one year
apart: United States v. Knotts1 14 and United States v. Karo."15 As the Court
explained in Knotts, "[a] beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated,
which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver."1' 6 By
using such devices, law enforcement agents-the recipients of the beepers'
110. Id. at 743.
111. See id. at 743-44 ("This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.").
112. Id. at744.
113. See id. at 745-46 ("The installation and use of a pen register... was not a 'search."').
114. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (finding that no search
occurred because the government's use of a tracking beeper disclosed no information that
officers could not have otherwise obtained simply by following the suspect's public
movements).
115. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (finding that the government's
use of a tracking beeper constituted a search to the extent that it revealed information about the
interior of a private residence).
116. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
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signals-are able to track the locations of the objects on or in which they are
placed. 117
The police in Knotts, having learned that a suspected manufacturer of
methamphetamine was purchasing chemicals from a particular company,
obtained the consent of that company to place a tracking beeper within a
container of chloroform prior to its purchase by the suspect." 8 After observing
the suspect make the purchase, officers followed the suspect's car by way of
visual surveillance and use of the tracking beeper." 9 Eventually, the officers
lost both visual surveillance and the signal from the beeper.' 20 When they
recovered the signal about one hour later, they found that it had come to rest
near a secluded cabin owned by Knotts. Importantly, "after the location in
the area of the cabin had been initially determined," law enforcement agents
ceased their use of the beeper.'2 2 Based largely upon tracking the chloroform to
the cabin, officers were able to secure a search warrant for the premises.'
23
The Knotts Court ruled that no search had taken place because the way in
which the police had used the tracking beeper had not invaded any reasonable
expectation of privacy. 24  It began its analysis by pointing out that the
defendant was attempting to assert a privacy interest in conduct that was of a
public nature: "The governmental surveillance conducted by means of the
beeper in this case amounted principally to the following of an automobile on
public streets and highways.' 25 In light of this characterization, the Court
made clear that "[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
117. See, e.g., id. at 278 (describing how officers used the tracking beeper to follow the
container of chloroform in which they had placed the beeper).
118. See id. (describing the circumstances that gave rise to the installation of the tracking
beeper by law enforcement).
119. See id. ("When Armstrong made the purchase, officers followed the car in which the
chloroform had been placed, maintaining contact by using both visual surveillance and a
monitor which received the signals sent from the beeper.").
120. See id. (stating that "the pursuing agents ended their visual surveillance" and "[a]t
about the same time... lost the signal from the beeper").
121. See id. (describing how officers rediscovered the signal and identified the defendant's
cabin as its stationary location).
122. Id. at 278-79 (emphasis added).
123. See id. at 279 ("Relying on the location of the chloroform derived through the use of
the beeper and additional information obtained during... intermittent visual surveillance of
respondent's cabin, officers secured a search warrant.").
124. See id. at 285 (holding that police monitoring of tracking beeper signals under the
facts of the case did not "invade any legitimate expectation of privacy" held by the defendant).
125. Id. at 281.
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another."'' 26 Although the Court conceded that the defendant had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the cabin itself, it declared that this expectation did
not encompass "the visual observation of [his accomplice's] automobile
arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway."'127 As these passages
indicate, the Court focused heavily on the fact that police could have learned
everything that the beeper disclosed to them-namely, that the container ended
up at the defendant's cabin-simply by observing the driver's movements in
public. 128 Relying on this same rationale, the Court concluded by rejecting the
defendant's argument that the failure of the government's visual surveillance
meant that their use of the beeper to find the cabin invaded a protected sphere
of privacy:
Admittedly, because of the failure of the visual surveillance, the beeper
enabled the law enforcement officials in this case to ascertain the ultimate
resting place of the chloroform when they would not have been able to do
so had they relied solely on their naked eyes. But scientific enhancement of
this sort raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not
also raise. A police car following [the driver] at a distance throughout his
journey could have observed him leaving the public highway and arriving
at the cabin owned by respondent with the drum of chloroform still in the
car.... [T]here is no indication that the beeper was used in any way to
reveal information as to the movement of the drum within the cabin, or in
any way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the
cabin. 
29
Because the defendant was attempting to claim a Fourth Amendment interest in
information that officers could have observed publicly, the Court concluded
that the defendant's asserted expectation of privacy was not reasonable and
that, accordingly, no search had taken place. 130
One year later in United States v. Karo, the Court imposed an important
limitation on the holding in Knotts.13 1 In Karo, police obtained a court order-
later declared invalid-to install a beeper on a container of ether after learning
from an informant that the defendant and others were prepared to purchase a
significant amount of that chemical for the purpose of extracting cocaine from
126. Id.
127. Id. at 282.
128. See id. ("Visual surveillance from public places along [the driver's] route or adjoining
Knotts' premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police.").
129. Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
130. See supra note 124 (describing the Court's ultimate conclusion in Knotts).
131. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (finding that the government's
use of a tracking beeper was a "search" because it revealed information about the interior of a
home).
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clothing. 132 Officers observed the defendant make the purchase and followed
him to his home using both visual surveillance and the beeper. 3 3 Later that
day, agents relied upon the beeper to ensure that the container was still in the
defendant's home.' 34 In the ensuing weeks and months, police continued to
utilize the beeper to track the frequent movements of the ether among the
defendant's accomplices, using it two other times to determine its presence in
private locations. 135 In the first instance, officers relied upon the beeper to
approximate that the chemicals were being held in a commercial storage unit
rented by one of the defendant's accomplices.136 Later, after observing that the
chemicals had been transported to a home occupied by three of the defendant's
accomplices, agents twice used the beeper to ensure that the ether remained in
that residence. 137 On the basis of this information, law enforcement officials
secured a warrant to search the residence in which the chemicals came to
rest. 138
The Court swiftly distinguished Karo's facts from those in Knotts. It
noted that unlike the law enforcement agents in Knotts, the agents in Karo had
used a tracking beeper to locate the item within a particular residence, a fact
that agents readily conceded in their search warrant application. 139 In light of
this distinction, the Karo Court asked "whether the monitoring of a beeper in a
private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth
Amendment rights of those who have ajustifiable interest in the privacy of the
residence." 40 The Court concluded that this more intrusive form of monitoring
constitutes a search that, when conducted without a warrant, violates the Fourth
Amendment. 14'
132. See id. at 708 (describing the circumstances under which the police initiated their
beeper-based surveillance).
133. See id. ("[A]gents saw Karo pick up the ether .... They then followed Karo to his
house using visual and beeper surveillance.").
134. See id. ("At one point later that day, agents determined by using the beeper that the
ether was still inside the house. .. ").
135. See id. at 708-09 (recounting the continued movements of the ether and the agents'
use of the tracking beeper to keep up with those movements).
136. See id. at 708 ("Using the beeper, agents confirmed that the ether was indeed in one of
the lockers in the row containing [the locker rented by an accomplice of the defendant] ....").
137. See id. at 709-10 ("[A]gents determined, using the beeper monitor, that the beeper can
was still inside the house. Again [the next day], the beeper revealed that the ether can was still
on the premises.").
138. Id. at 710.
139. See id. at 714 ("[Tlhe beeper was used to locate the ether in a specific house in Taos,
NM, and... that information was in turn used to secure a warrant for the search of the house.").
140. Id.
141. See id. (finding that "the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence ... not open to
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Citing the heightened level of privacy guaranteed to the home under the
Fourth Amendment, the Karo Court stated that the use of the beeper in this
case told agents "that a particular article [was] actually located at a particular
time in the private residence and [was] in the possession of the person or
persons whose residence [was] being watched."' 42 This, said the Court, is as
offensive to the Fourth Amendment as an agent entering the residence without
a warrant to see if the item is actually inside. 143 Again emphasizing the
difference between its facts and those in Knotts, the Court characterized the
surveillance here as "reveal[ing] a critical fact about the interior of the premises
that the Government [was] extremely interested in knowing and that it could
not have otherwise obtained without a warrant." 144  After providing this
rationale, the Court concluded by rejecting a government argument that is
particularly relevant in the CSLI context:
If agents are required to obtain warrants prior to monitoring a beeper when
it has been withdrawn from public view, the Government argues, for all
practical purposes they will be forced to obtain warrants in every case in
which they seek to use a beeper, because they will have no way of knowing
in advance whether the beeper will be transmitting its signals from inside
private residences. The argument that a warrant requirement would oblige
the Government to obtain warrants in a large number of cases is hardly a
compelling argument against the requirement.
45
Taken together, Knotts and Karo establish a "public/private dichotomy"
that governs the Fourth Amendment validity of law enforcement use of tracking
devices. 46 The result of these cases is that "a warrant is constitutionally
required if and only if the location information extends onto private
property."'147 Thus, in the absence of a warrant, "the Government may use a
tracking device to ascertain an individual's location on a public highway but
not in a private home." 
148
visual surveillance[] violates the Fourth Amendment rights" of individuals with privacy interests
in the residence).
142. Id. at 715.
143. See id. (comparing the surveillance in question to warrantless physical intrusions into
the home and finding that "[f]or purposes of the Amendment, the result is the same" because the
government acted without a warrant "to obtain information that it could not have obtained by
observation from outside the... house").
144. Id.
145. Id. at 718.
146. See Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 613 (W.D. Pa. 2008) ("[T]he public/private
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C. Real-time CSLI Jurisprudence: Widespread Rejection of the
Hybrid Theory
As previously indicated, there has been a significant amount of litigation
at the district court level regarding what standard governs the disclosure of real-
time CSLI.149 In most of this litigation, the Government has sought to compel
disclosure of real-time CSLI by combining various pieces of electronic
surveillance law, including selected provisions of the PRS, the SCA, and the
CALEA. 150 This approach is known as the "hybrid" or "dual authority"
theory.
51
The government's hybrid theory argument rests upon three premises)
52
First, the government asserts that the USA PATRIOT Act15 3 expanded the PRS
definitions of "pen register" and "trap and trace device" in such a way that
CSLI is now obtainable under the PRS. 54 Specifically, the government notes
that these terms now encompass "signaling information transmitted by an
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is
transmitted,"'155 a category that it feels includes CSLI. 156 The second step in the
government's argument arises from the CALEA's prohibition on obtaining
location information "solely pursuant to" the PRS.157 Focusing on the "solely
149. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (providing a brief synopsis of the state
of prospective CSLI jurisprudence).
150. See, e.g., In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Auth. (Smith), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (describing the
government's "hybrid theory," which combines parts of the PRS, the CALEA, and the SCA to
argue for disclosure of CSLI at the SCA's "specific and articulable facts" standard).
151. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of
Prospective Cell Site Info. (Adelman), No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743, at *3 (E.D. Wis.
Oct. 6, 2006) ("Courts have characterized this as a 'hybrid' or 'dual authority' theory.... ").
152. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and
Use of a Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device, and for Geographic Location Info.
(McGiverin), 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306-09 (D.P.R. 2007) (working through the three steps that
make up the government's "hybrid theory" argument).
153. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272.
154. See McGiverin, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (noting the government's assertion that CSLI
falls within the PRS because that statute now defines "pen register" as a device that can record
"signaling information").
155. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006).
156. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location
Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel. (Kaplan), 460 F. Supp. 2d 448,455 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (accepting
the government's argument that CSLI "is 'signaling information' within the meaning ofthe Pen
Register Statute").
157. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
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pursuant to" language, the government claims that the CALEA permits law
enforcement to obtain location information using the PRS in conjunction with
another statute.158 The final premise in the hybrid theory argument is that "the
Stored Communications Act provides the additional authority required by
CALEA."' 159 From these premises, the government concludes that it may
compel disclosure of real-time CSLI when it satisfies the SCA's disclosure
standard, 160 which it does when it provides "specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the ... [CSLI] sought
[is] relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." 
161
Generally, the government has had very little success in compelling the
disclosure of real-time CSLI by way of its hybrid theory argument.162 Courts
that reject the theory primarily do so by casting doubt on one or more of its
premises. Although most courts do not question the government's first
premise-that CSLI falls within the post-PATRIOT Act scope of the PRS-at
least one judge argues against it.163 Judge Smith contends that the PATRIOT
Act's expanded pen/trap definitions were intended only to cover
communications such as email: "The added term 'dialing, routing, addressing,
and signaling information,' while not defined in the statute, was touted by the
bill's proponents as a way to update the [PRS] to cover Internet traffic.' 4
Judge Smith also questions whether, apart from this legislative history, the new
definitions fairly can be read to encompass CSLI, pointing out that information
sought under the PRS still must be incident to a "wire or electronic
Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or
Cell Site Info. (Orenstein), 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The government
recognizes that CALEA bars it from seeking to compel a provider to disclose information via a
pen register that reveals a mobile telephone user's location 'solely pursuant to' the [PRS].").
158. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and
Use of a Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device, and for Geographic Location Info.
(McGiverin), 497 F. Supp. 2d 301,307 (D.P.R. 2007) ("[T]he government... contend[s] that
the phrase 'solely pursuant' necessarily directs that the [PRS] may be used in combination with
some other... authority for release of information that may disclose physical location.").
159. Kaplan, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
160. See, e.g., In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Auth. (Smith), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (noting the government's
view that CSLI can be obtained under the § 2703(d) "specific and articulable facts" standard).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006).
162. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (noting that, as of August 1, 2009, twenty of
twenty-eight decisions addressing applications for disclosure of real-time CSLI have held the
proper standard to be probable cause rather than the standard provided in § 2703(d)).
163. See Smith, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62 (arguing that the post-PATRIOT Act definitions
in the PRS do not cover CSLI).
164. Id. at 761.
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communication."' 165 Because CSLI is transmitted without the making or
receiving of a call, Judge Smith argues that CSLI does not arise out of a wire or
electronic communication and thus does not fall within the PRS.
16 6
The hybrid theory's second premise-that the CALEA's prohibition on
obtaining location information "solely pursuant to" the PRS means that such
information can be obtained by using the PRS in conjunction with another
statute-also faces criticism. 167 To begin with, opponents of the hybrid theory
note that using the PRS in conjunction with another law is not the only way law
enforcement agents can obtain prospective CSLI; they also have the option of
obtaining a Rule 41 warrant based on probable cause or a wiretap
"superwarrant" under 18 U.S.C. § 2518.168 More fundamentally, opponents of
the theory question whether the PRS has any connection to the SCA under
federal surveillance law. 169 These courts point out that the CALEA was not
intended to expand or alter the existing surveillance options available to law
enforcement, but was instead simply meant to ensure that communications
providers would be capable of providing surveillance information to law
enforcement officials. 70  Opponents further note that FBI Director Freeh
testified before Congress that the law has "nothing to do with 'transactional
information"' protected by the SCA and that the CALEA "does not relate to
[the SCA].'' Judge Smith summarized this final basis for rejecting the hybrid
theory's second premise: "Far from the silent synergy of disparate statutes now
posited by the government, the FBI director in 1994 was insisting that the
165. See id. at 762 ("[T]he expanded definition.., indicates that... 'signaling'
information is generated by, and incidental to, the transmission of 'a wire or electronic
communication."').
166. See id. (noting that CSLI is recorded without the transmission of any communication).
167. See infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text (discussing courts' rejection of the
hybrid theory's second premise).
168. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of
Prospective Cell Site Info. (Adelman), No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743, at *4 (E.D. Wis.
Oct. 6,2006) ("[T]here is no reason why the government could not obtain [CSLI] under Rule 41
or 18 U.S.C. § 2518.").
169. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or
Cell Site Info. (Orenstein), 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 319-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the
legislative history of the CALEA indicated a clear distinction between the scopes of the PRS
and the SCA); In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Auth. (Smith), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 762-64 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (same).
170. See Smith, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 762 ("One of CALEA's main objectives was to allow
law enforcement to retain existing surveillance capabilities in the face of technological
change....").
171. Id. at 763 (quoting CALEA Joint Hearings, supra note 87, at 27-28 (statement of
Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)).
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[PRS] has 'nothing to do with' the SCA, and that transactional information 'is
exclusively dealt with in chapter 121 of Title 18,' i.e., the SCA."0
72
Opponents also take issue with the hybrid theory's third premise, which
states that the SCA provides the supplementary authority (in addition to the
PRS) that the CALEA requires to obtain location information. On a basic
level, courts express qualms about allowing an act governing stored
communications to be used--even indirectly-to authorize real-time and
ongoing surveillance. 173 Furthermore, opponents point out that the core of the
SCA is a prohibition on the disclosure of subscriber information to
governmental authorities. 174 This general prohibition, they say, is subject to
only narrow and specified exceptions, none of which reference the PRS.
175
Given this fundamental proscription on disclosure, opponents declare that the
SCA "preclude[s] the very authority law enforcement seeks."'
176
Courts find further reason to reject the hybrid theory's final premise by
arguing that the SCA-specifically its § 2703(d) disclosure standard---cannot
possibly apply to CSLI. 177 The § 2703(d) standard can apply to CSLI only if
the government establishes that CSLI constitutes "record[s] or other
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [an electronic
communication] service." 178 Accordingly, courts that oppose the hybrid theory
argue that CSLI falls outside of this category, specifically because it does not
"pertain to" an "electronic communication service. '179  An "electronic
172. Id. at 764 (quoting CALEA Joint Hearings, supra note 87, at 27-28 (statement of
Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)).
173. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of
a Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device, and for Geographic Location Info.
(McGiverin), 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 309 (D.P.R. 2007) ("[Tlhe SCA, as its title announces,
contemplates orders for stored rather than prospective information .... ."); Orenstein, 396 F.
Supp. 2d at 308 (describing SCA orders as "inherently retrospective"); Smith, 396 F. Supp. 2d at
760 ("Unlike other titles of the ECPA, which regulate methods of real-time surveillance, the
SCA regulates access to records and communications in storage.").
174. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of
Prospective Cell Site Info. (Adelman), No. 06-MISC-004, 2006 WL 2871743, at *6 (E.D. Wis.
Oct. 6, 2006) (noting the SCA's general prohibition and the fact that it is subject to certain
exceptions).
175. See id. (pointing out the absence of an SCA exception for authorization under the
PRS).
176. Id.
177. See infra notes 178-86 and accompanying text (discussing courts' rejection of the
third premise of the hybrid theory).
178. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text (explaining the SCA's disclosure
framework with respect to "records or other information pertaining to a subscriber").
179. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or
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communication service" exists only when "wire or electronic communications"
are transmitted.180 With respect to CSLI, opponents argue that neither wire nor
electronic communications are involved.'8 1 CSLI (and, more generally, cellular
communications) cannot be "electronic communication[s]," they say, because
that term excludes communications from "tracking devices."'8 2 Courts that
reject the hybrid theory find that cell phones fall within the definition of
"tracking device"'8 3 because the definition merely requires that the device
"permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object." 8 4 Opponents
further assert that CSLI cannot be a "wire communication" because it does not
require or involve a transfer of the human voice. 8 5 Because they find that
CSLI arises without the transmission of a wire or electronic communication,
courts that reject the hybrid theory conclude that CSLI does not "pertain to a
subscriber to... an [electronic communication] service" and thus cannot be
disclosed under the SCA's § 2703(d) standard.1
8 6
Finally, opponents reject the hybrid theory because they view it as an
altogether unwarranted reading of the statutes. This position was best
articulated by Judge Smith:
Cell Site Info. (Orenstein), 396 F. Supp. 2d 294,308 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (summarizing the reasons
why CSLI does not "pertain to" subscribers' use of electronic communication services).
180. See, e.g., id. ("'Electronic communication service' must involve the transmission of
'wire or electronic communications."' (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006))).
181. See, e.g., id (stating why CSLI implicates neither wire nor electronic communications).
182. See, e.g., id. ("'[E]lectronic communication' excludes 'any communication from a
tracking device."' (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (2006))).
183. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and
Use of a Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device, and for Geographic Location Info.
(McGiverin), 497 F. Supp. 2d 301, 310 (D.P.R. 2007) (finding that cell phones constitute
"tracking devices"); In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Auth. (Smith), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 759 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (same).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
185. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or
Cell Site Info. (Orenstein), 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[A] 'wire
communication' must involve a transfer of the human voice." (citing 18 U.S.C. § 25 10(1))). A
separate reason for saying that the "wire communication" definition does not apply is that
cellular communications do not rely upon wires, cables, or like connections. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(1) (defining "wire communication" to require "transmission... by the aid of wire[] [or]
cable"). This reason possesses the added virtue of putting outside of the "wire communication"
definition all cellular communications, not just CSLI itself.
186. See Orenstein, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 307 (rejecting the government's contention that it




The most glaring difficulty in meshing these disparate statutory provisions
is that with a single exception they do not cross-reference one another. The
[PRS] does not mention the SCA or CALEA; SCA § 2703 does not
mention CALEA or the [PRS]; and the CALEA proviso does not mention
the SCA. CALEA does refer to the [PRS], but only in the negative sense of
disclaiming its applicability. Surely if these various statutory provisions
were intended to give birth to a new breed of electronic surveillance, one
would expect Congress to have openly acknowledged paternity somewhere
along the way. This is especially so given that no other form of electronic
surveillance has the mixed statutory parentage that prospective cell site data
is claimed to have.
187
Despite these compelling arguments against the hybrid theory, some courts
accept the theory and allow the disclosure of real-time CSLI under the SCA's
§ 2703(d) standard. 8 8 These courts accept all three of the hybrid theory's
premises. First, they believe that the post-PATRIOT Act definitions in the
PRS, particularly by way of their inclusion of "signaling information," bring
CSLI within the scope of the PRS. 189 They reject the argument that the
PATRIOT Act did not intend CSLI to fall under the PRS by asserting that the
clear language of the PRS precludes the need to look at legislative history.19°
Courts that permit disclosure under the SCA standard also accept the
hybrid theory's second premise:
[T]he most natural reading of Section 1002(a)(2) [of the CALEA] is that
[CSLI] may not be disclosed pursuant to the [PRS] alone without
authorization by some other statutory provision. It follows that [CSLI] may
be disclosed pursuant to the [PRS] and some additional statutory authority.
In other words, Section 1002 does not prevent courts from authorizing the
disclosure of [CSLI] under the [PRS]. It merely requires additional
statutory authority for any such order.'
9'
187. Smith, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 764-65.
188. See supra note 19 (noting that eight of twenty-eight decisions to address the proper
standard for the disclosure of real-time CSLI have held that probable cause is not required).
189. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location
Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel. (Kaplan), 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("The
amended definitions encompass the cell site information the government seeks here.").
190. See, e.g., id. at 456 (rejecting the view that the new PRS definitions were meant only
to cover e-mail).
191. Id. at 457. Accord In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing Release
of Subscriber and Other Info. (Rosenthal), 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416-17 (S.D. Tex. 2007)
(reading the CALEA to allow the PRS to be used with an additional statute).
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These courts reject the view that § 1002(a)(2) should be read to prohibit the
obtaining of location information through the PRS altogether, stating that such
a reading would give no effect to Congress's inclusion of the word "solely." 92
Finally, courts that accept the hybrid theory find that the SCA applies to
CSLI and that the SCA therefore can provide the additional authority permitted
by the CALEA.193 Many of these courts assert that CSPs provide an "electronic
communications service" without providing an explanation as to how CSPs fit
within that definition. 94 These courts further claim that real-time CSLI can
constitute "a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber," pointing
out that CSLI is at least momentarily stored before it is turned over to law
enforcement officials.1 95 Proponents of the hybrid theory conclude their
defense of the SCA's applicability by arguing that the "tracking device"
exception either does not apply or, as one court declared, is irrelevant:
Whether a cell phone is a tracking device.., is immaterial to the precise
question before the Court, which is whether the government is entitled to an
order under Section 2703. That section... [covers] disclosure of"a record
or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or a customer of an
electronic communications service." It does not authorize the disclosure of
an "electronic communication.... ." For the tracking device exception to
have force here, the Court would have to incorporate the term "electronic
communication" into the term "electronic communications service."
196
On the basis of their acceptance of the hybrid theory's three premises, courts
that accept the theory conclude that the government can compel disclosure of
real-time CSLI-through the combined use of the PRS and the SCA, as
authorized by the CALEA-upon a showing of"specific and articulable facts"
establishing that the CSLI being sought is "relevant and material to an ongoing
192. See Rosenthal, 622 F. Supp 2d at 417 (explaining that the opposite conclusion "gives
effect to the 'solely pursuant' language in CALEA"); Kaplan, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 458 ("This
interpretation... requires reading the word 'solely' out of the statute entirely .... ).
193. See Rosenthal, 622 F. Supp 2d at 417 (accepting Judge Kaplan's conclusion that
CSLI fits within the SCA); Kaplan, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60 (explaining how CSLI fits within
the framework of the SCA).
194. See Rosenthal, 622 F. Supp 2d at 417 (citing to Judge Kaplan and stating that courts
have found CSPs to be providers of an "electronic communications service"); Kaplan, 460 F.
Supp. 2d at 459 ("Cell phone service providers clearly fit within th[e] definition [of 'electronic
communications service'].").
195. See Kaplan, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 459 ("The [SCA] contains no explicit limitation on the
disclosure of prospective data. Further, the information the government requests is, in fact, a
stored, historical record because it will be received by the [CSP] and stored, if only
momentarily, before being forwarded to law enforcement officials.").
196. Id. at 460.
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criminal investigation."' 197 For the reasons set out above, this view has proven
difficult to defend and has been widely rejected by courts.
IV. Historical CSLI: Arguments Surrounding the Proper Standard
A. Statutory Arguments
1. Applying the SCA Alone to Historical CSLI
As the previous section indicates, one of the reasons courts have rebuffed
governmental efforts to obtain prospective CSLI is their unwillingness to apply
the SCA-a statute governing disclosure of stored communications-to real-
time information.198 This problem seemingly is eliminated in the context of
historical CSLI, which appears to fit much more comfortably within the SCA
framework.' 99 Although many courts--either expressly or in dicta-have relied
on this logic to conclude that historical CSLI can be disclosed under the SCA's
"specific and articulable facts" standard, 200 a closer look at the SCA calls this
conclusion into question.
a. Applying the "Tracking Device" Definition
Because cellular communications, and thus CSLI, do not qualify as a form
of"wire communication, 0'0 the SCA applies to historical CSLI only if cellular
communications can be classified as a form of "electronic communication."2 2
The term "electronic communication" explicitly excludes "communication[s]
from a tracking device, 20 3 and "tracking device" is defined as "an electronic or
197. See, e.g., id. at 462 (concluding that the SCA's § 2703(d) standard governs the
compelled disclosure of real-time CSLI).
198. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the unwillingness of courts to
apply the SCA to real-time CSLI).
199. See, e.g., In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Auth. (Smith), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 759 n.16 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("By contrast,
historical cell site data more comfortably fits the category of transactional records covered by
the SCA.").
200. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (citing to cases that have held or stated
in dicta that historical CSLI can be disclosed under the SCA standard).
201. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (illustrating why cellular communications,
and thus CSLI, do not qualify as a form of "wire communication").
202. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (explaining that the scope of the SCA is
limited to stored wire and electronic communications).
203. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C) (2006).
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mechanical device whichpermits the tracking of the movement of a person or
object."204 Thus, the SCA does not allow for the disclosure of information
gathered from devices that have tracking capabilities, at least when wire
communications are not at issue.
Those who argue that probable cause-not § 2703(d) of the SCA-should
govern the disclosure of historical CSLI note the striking breadth of the
tracking device definition, focusing on the fact that the device need only
"permit" tracking.20 5 In light of the fact that cell phones allow for the discovery
of their users' locations to within at least a few hundred feet, it seems beyond
question that they are devices which "permit" tracking.2 °6 This conclusion does
not change, proponents of probable cause assert, simply because the location
information in question has been stored:
[This] explanation is tantamount to an assertion that the mere storage of
what appears indisputably to be information from a tracking device when
garnered, alters its character. No such archival alchemy is possible. The
frequent and specific information of our physical movements now
transmitted by our cell phones is, necessarily, and remains, information
from a device that permits the tracking of movement. The source of
information does not change when it is stored.20 7
More importantly, if location information ceases to be a "communication from a
tracking device" at the moment when it is stored, then the SCA, which governs
only stored communications, has no need for its tracking device exclusion.208
Because historical CSLI falls squarely within the tracking device definition,
proponents of the probable cause standard argue, it necessarily falls outside the
scope of the SCA.2°9
204. Id. § 3117(b) (emphasis added).
205. See, e.g., In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code,
Section 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. and Historical Cell Site Info. (Alexander 1), 509 F.
Supp. 2d 64, 74 (D. Mass. 2007) (describing the definition as "broad" and citing to other cases
that have described it similarly), rev'd, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007).
206. See Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 602 (W.D. Pa. 2008) ("Even without triangulation,
our cell phones transmit-and our CSPs record-information of our movements to a few
hundred feet. It-is, therefore, extremely difficult to see how a cell phone is not now precisely an
'electronic... device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object."'
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b))).
207. Id. at 603.
208. See id. (concluding that the SCA's express exclusion of communications from
tracking devices would be rendered superfluous if one accepts the view that such
communications can no longer be considered "from tracking devices" once they are stored).
209. See id. at 601 (stating that historical CSLI is beyond the reach of the SCA because the
tracking device definition means that historical CSLI is not an "electronic communication").
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Those who believe that historical CSLI can be disclosed under the SCA
standard, on the other hand, attempt to argue their way around the SCA's
tracking device limitation. Judge Steams, for instance, points out that the
information allowed to be disclosed under § 2703(d) is significantly more
detailed than the simple "transactional" data that can be disclosed under
§ 2703(c) by mere subpoena.210 Because of this, he sees no problem with using
§ 2703(d) (the "specific and articulable facts" standard) to obtain detailed
information such as CSLI.21 1 Additionally, Judge Steams argues that the
tracking device limitation is of no consequence to § 2703(d): "[N]othing in
the ... definition of a mobile tracking device places a limitation on the 'records
or other information' obtainable pursuant to a section 2703(d) order.
2 12
On the question of whether the SCA's tracking device limitation applies,
the arguments made by proponents of probable cause effectively undermine
Judge Steams's view. In short, Judge Steams's contention on behalf of
opponents of the probable cause standard misses the point; the tracking device
definition need not expressly limit § 2703(d) because the SCA (which includes
§ 2703(d)) already disclaims its applicability to tracking devices.213 Proponents
of probable cause, therefore, are correct to find that CSLI falls outside the
scope of the SCA.
b. Is Historical CSLI "Records or Other Information" Under § 2703(c)?
For historical CSLI to be disclosed under the SCA's § 2703(d) standard, it
must qualify as "a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or
customer of [an electronic communication] service., 214 Those who argue for
the probable cause standard contend that historical CSLI falls outside of this
category. They begin by restating their position that CSLI is excluded from the
SCA's definition of "electronic communication" because it constitutes data
210. See In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section
2703(d) (Steams), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 n.8 (D. Mass. 2007) ("[T]he 'records and other
information' obtainable by means of a section 2703(d) order must consist of data containing
greater detail than the records subject to an administrative subpoena by section 2703(c)(2).").
211. See id. (accepting the use of § 2703(d) to obtain relatively detailed communications
data).
212. Id.
213. See supra note 56 (providing examples of provisions in the SCA that illustrate that the
Act's scope is limited to wire and electronic communications); supra notes 73-74 and
accompanying text (explaining that tracking devices are excluded from the SCA's definition of
"electronic communication").
214. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2006).
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from a "tracking device." 215 They then argue that the tracking device limitation
is meaningless if"stored information from a tracking device nonetheless comes
directly back-as a record pertaining to an electronic communication service-
into the scope of the SCA. 2 16 In an attempt to reconcile the SCA's exclusion
of tracking device information with its coverage of "record[s] or other
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [an electronic
communication] service," proponents of probable cause advocate a narrow
reading of § 2703(c):
This court... read[s] the provision of§ 2703(c) to authorize disclosure of
records and other information directly pertaining to a subscriber/customer
of an electronic communication service. That is, information that is
regarding or derived under a service (e.g., a tracking capability/function)
that may be used to facilitate the provision of an electronic communication
service (e.g., the transmission of voice/text material), but that is not itself an
electronic communication service (as, e.g., by definition), does not
"pertain" to the subscriber of an electronic communications service within
the meaning of the statute.
217
Those who oppose the application of probable cause to the disclosure of
historical CSLI reject this interpretation of § 2703(c), arguing that it instead
must be understood in light of the "ordinary usage" of its language.218 Judge
Steams outlined this position: "In the relevant context, a record means
something stored or archived. The term information is synonymous with data.
[CSPs] store data gleaned from the cell towers through which telephone calls
are routed. Thus, historical [CSLI] is a 'record or other information pertaining
to' a customer .... ,219
Although the ordinary usage approach has an obvious logical appeal, it
possesses a fatal flaw that is not fleshed out by the proponents' arguments: It is
premised upon the erroneous assumption that CSPs provide an "electronic
communication service." In order for a service to constitute an "electronic
communication service" under the SCA, it must "provide[] ... users [with] the
ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications., 220 Cellular
215. See Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 604 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (describing CSLI as a
communication from a "tracking device," as that term is defined statutorily).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section
2703(d) (Steams), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D. Mass. 2007) ("Since neither the term 'record' nor
the term 'information' is defined by the SCA, a court must look to the meaning of the terms in
their ordinary usage.").
219. Id.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2006).
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telephone calls and text messages are not "wire communications" because they
are not made through wires, cables, or similar connections, 221 and are not
"electronic communications" because they derive from devices that "permit the
tracking of the movement of a person or object."222 Accordingly, CSPs do not
provide an "electronic communication service" within the meaning of the SCA.
The "ordinary usage" approach applied by opponents of the probable cause
standard, therefore, fails to place its interpretation within the context of the
statute as a whole. When that context is taken into account, it becomes clear
that historical CSLI cannot be classified as "a record or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of [an electronic communication]
service."
2. Revisiting the Hybrid Theory
As discussed above, courts have widely rejected the government's hybrid
theory in the context of applications for real-time CSLI.223 The question
remains, at least to some, whether the hybrid theory is still alive in the historical
CSLI context. Courts that feel that the question is closed-those that require
probable cause for the disclosure of historical CSLI-simply argue that the
rationales for rejecting the hybrid theory with respect to real-time CSLI apply
with equal force to historical CSLI.224 This view is compelling given that the
arguments against the hybrid theory are not specific to prospective CSLI, but
are attacks on the logic of the theory itself. Although some courts that have
allowed disclosure of historical CSLI under the § 2703(d) standard have
avoided the hybrid theory and reached their decisions through the SCA
alone,225 at least one court has compelled disclosure of historical CSLI using
221. See id. § 2510(1) (defining the term "wire communication" to require
"transmission... by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection").
222. See id. § 2510(12)(C) (excluding "communication[s] from [] tracking device[s]" from
the definition of "electronic communication"); see also id. § 3117(b) (defining the term
"tracking device"). For a fuller discussion of how the "tracking device" limitation applies to
historical CSLI, see supra Part IV.A. l.a.
223. See supra Part III.C (discussing the hybrid theory and its rejection by a significant
majority of courts).
224. See Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 609 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (declaring with respect to the
hybrid theory that the court "need not tarry on this widely-and rightly-refuted contention");
In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2703(d) to
Disclose Subscriber Info. and Historical Cell Site Info. (Alexander I), 509 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72
(D. Mass. 2007) ("This 'hybrid' approach has, however, largely been rejected as contrary to
Congress'[s] intentions."), rev'd, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2007).
225. See, e.g., In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code,
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the hybrid theory.226 Nevertheless, this court's acceptance of the theory was
conclusory and devoid of analysis. After laying out the familiar hybrid theory
logic, it declared:
Both historical and prospective cell-site data are "a record or other
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of' an electronic
communication service. Under this approach, the Government may obtain
certain cell-site information under the [PRS] and the [SCA] if, as here, it
makes the showing required under both statutes.227
Given the many valid reasons for rejecting the hybrid theory with respect to all
types of CSLI, as well as the lack of any substantive reason for responding to
these criticisms and accepting the theory in the historical CSLI context, it seems
safe to say that the hybrid theory has no place in historical CSLI jurisprudence.
3. Understanding the CALEA and Its Legislative History
Another contentious point in CSLI literature and jurisprudence is how
courts should understand the CALEA's limitation on the disclosure of location
information and the legislative history that gave rise to that limitation.
Proponents of applying probable cause to historical CSLI rely heavily on the
legislative history of the CALEA, noting that its passage was dependent upon
assurances from the FBI that the CALEA would not change the then-existing
228asettathrequirements for obtaining location information. Thus, they assert that the
CALEA constitutes Congress's clear intent to prevent disclosure of location
information except under the traditional standard that governs disclosure,
namely probable cause: "With CALEA, which specifically and unequivocally
prohibits the Government's use of the [PRS] to enable its commandeering of an
unsuspecting user's cell phone as a tracking device, Congress clearly
Section 2703(d) (Steams), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding that because
historical CSLI is a "record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of' an
electronic communication service it can be disclosed under the SCA's § 2703(d) standard).
226. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Installation and
Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber
and Other Info. (Rosenthal), 622 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (permitting the
disclosure of both historical and prospective CSLI under the combined authority of the PRS and
SCA, thereby accepting the hybrid theory).
227. Id. (citations omitted).
228. See Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 596-97 (discussing FBI Director Louis Freeh's
testimony before Congress on the CALEA as well as its implications for CSLI disclosure).
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demonstrated its intent to prevent the tracking of individuals without a probable
cause determination.
2 29
Those who oppose a probable cause standard for historical CSLI reject
this characterization of the CALEA and its legislative history, instead looking
more closely at the context in which FBI Director Freeh's comments were
made. They point out that at the time Freeh made his comments in 1994,
"pen/trap devices, as statutorily defined [in the PRS] in 1986, were...
incapable of determining cell phone locations," and the use of computers to
store CSLI "was a somewhat distant, if not unimagined vision-especially for
law enforcement investigative uses., 230 They further note that Director Freeh,
in acknowledging that cellular carriers compiled location information at that
time, dismissed concern over such data, saying that it merely was used for
business purposes and that it did not raise the risk of "true tracking.
23'
Because "true tracking" referred to surveillance of the sort that took place in
Knotts and required probable cause, opponents of probable cause contend that
Director Freeh's testimony rejected the view that CSLI can be disclosed only
upon a showing of probable cause.232 Opponents additionally argue that Freeh
was concerned with limiting disclosure of "call setup information" rather than
data related to business purposes, the latter of which he thought included
CSLI.233 Accordingly, opponents of probable cause conclude that Director
Freeh-and therefore Congress, in enacting the CALEA--did not mean to
bring CSLI within the CALEA's limitation upon the disclosure of location
information.234
Although the argument made by opponents of probable cause has some
validity, there is a basis for rejecting it that is independent from the basis put
forth by proponents of probable cause. It is true that at the time, Director Freeh
could not have known that the PRS subsequently would come to cover
processes such as the storage of CSLI. Nevertheless, Congress subsequently
expanded the scope of the PRS apparently to include CSLI without making any
229. Alexander I, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
230. Clark, supra note 8, at 1463.
231. See id. ("Director Freeh conceived of cell phone location information as data only for
business... and not, in his words, for the sort of 'true tracking' engaged in by law enforcement
for criminal investigative purposes.").
232. See id. at 1463-64 (describing the notion of"true tracking" and noting that Freeh was
aware of its meaning and the various disclosure tools available to law enforcement).
233. See id. at 1464 (distinguishing between "call setup information," with which Freeh
was concerned, and "transactional" data relating to business, with which he was not concerned).
234. See id. at 1463-65 (analyzing Freeh's testimony before Congress and concluding that
CSLI was not intended to be affected by the "location information" limitation in the CALEA).
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corresponding changes to the CALEA.235 The necessary conclusion to be
drawn from this course of action is that the present intent of Congress with
respect to the CALEA is to prevent the PRS-as it now exists-from being
used to compel disclosure of "information that may disclose the physical
location of the subscriber., 236 Because CSLI discloses the physical location of
a subscriber, it currently falls within the CALEA limitation-regardless of what
Director Freeh and Congress may have intended or foreseen in 1994.
B. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudential Arguments
1. Is the Fourth Amendment Even Implicated?
The question of whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the disclosure
of historical CSLI depends upon whether such disclosure constitutes a "search"
for purposes of the Amendment.237 Under Justice Harlan's classic formulation,
a search occurs when an individual manifests an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and when that expectation is one that society is prepared to accept as
reasonable.238 The application of this definition to historical CSLI breeds a
corresponding two-part inquiry: (1) whether cell phone users can manifest an
actual expectation that their stored location information will remain private; and
(2) whether, if so, society would find this expectation to be reasonable.
Proponents of the probable cause standard argue that each of these questions
239can be answered in the affirmative, while opponents attack both prongs,
thereby claiming that the Fourth Amendment is not even implicated by the
disclosure of historical CSLI. 240
Proponents of the probable cause standard assert that cell phone users
maintain a subjective expectation of privacy in historical records of their
235. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (discussing the PATRIOT Act's
expansion of the PRS and the government's contention that the PRS now covers CSLI).
236. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2000).
237. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated unless a governmental action constitutes either a "search" or a "seizure").
238. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining
the term "search" to require both a subjective and objective (reasonable) expectation of privacy).
239. See infra notes 241-42, 244-47, 249-51 and accompanying text (explaining the
reasons why proponents of probable cause for historical CSLI believe that individuals maintain
subjective and reasonable expectations of privacy in such data).
240. See infra notes 243,248 and accompanying text (noting the argument of opponents of
probable cause that individuals maintain neither subjective nor reasonable expectations of
privacy in historical CSLI).
1782
COURT ORDERED DISCLOSURE
movements because most do not even know that such records can be created.24 1
Judge Lenihan summarized this position:
The Court believes, based on common experience within the community:
First, that Americans do not generally know that a record of their
whereabouts is being created whenever they travel about with their cell
phones, or that such record is likely maintained by their cell phone
providers and is potentially subject to review by interested Government
officials. And second, that most Americans would be appalled by the
notion that the Government could obtain such a record without at least a
neutral, judicial determination of probable cause.
242
Opponents of probable cause-those who assert that historical CSLI can be
disclosed under the lesser SCA standard-contend that the assumption of the
risk and tracking beeper cases preclude a finding that individuals can have a
subjective expectation of privacy in stored CSLI.243
Those who argue that probable cause should govern the disclosure of
historical CSLI also assert that the expectation of privacy in such data is one
that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.244 First, they rely on the
aforementioned view that society would find appalling the idea that the
government could surreptitiously track their movements without a judicial
finding of probable cause. 245 They also believe that the expectation of privacy
in historical CSLI is reasonable "because the [use of such] newly-emergent
technologies create[s] a potential to monitor associational activities in a manner
that could have a chilling effect," which is a result that society would not wish
to condone.246 Finally, proponents of probable cause contend that "the very fact
that Congress has taken pains to protect electronically-derived location
241. See Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 611 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (finding that Americans
possess a subjective expectation of privacy in their past movements recorded by the storage of
CSLI).
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code,
Section 2703(d) (Steams), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding that historical CSLI
is governed by Knots and that, therefore, no subjective expectation of privacy is implicated by
attempting to prevent its disclosure); Clark, supra note 8, at 1470-71 (arguing that the
assumption of the risk doctrine bars a finding of a subjective expectation of privacy in CSLI).
For a discussion of the application of the assumption of the risk and tracking beeper cases in the
historical CSLI context, see infra Parts IV.B.2-3.
244. See, e.g., Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 612 ("The Court further finds that the
expectation of privacy in movement/location information... is objectively reasonable .... ").
245. See id. at 611 ("[Mlost Americans would be appalled by the notion that the
Government could obtain [CSLI] without at least a neutral, judicial determination of probable
cause.").
246. Id. at 612.
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information from unwarranted disclosure [in the CALEA and § 3117(b)] serves
independently to make subjectively-held expectations of privacy objectively
reasonable. 2 47 Opponents of probable cause again point to the assumption of
the risk and tracking beeper cases, arguing that these lines of jurisprudence
preclude a finding that subjectively held expectations of privacy in historical
CSLI are reasonable.
248
Proponents of probable cause extend their argument one step further,
contending that past expectations of privacy remain reasonable even after the
events giving rise to those expectations have come to pass.249 Specifically, they
point out that an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy in the fact that
she was going to travel to a certain location (or was then present at a location)
does not vanish after she travels to and then leaves that location.2 50 In other
words, if an individual wishes not to disclose information about the destinations
to which she will be traveling, that individual maintains a privacy interest in
guarding against disclosure of those destinations even after having gone to and
left them. Judge Alexander explained this point: "It would be nonsensical to
think that revelation of a location that [one] wished to keep secret up to and
during his attendance would suddenly become appropriate simply because the
activity is over and he has left the location. 251 This argument defends against
the claim that individuals lose the expectation of privacy they may have in their
locations and movements, recorded in real-time by CSLI, once those
movements, and thus the CSLI, can be classified as "historical."
2. Assumption of the Risk
In United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled
that individuals possess no legitimate expectation of privacy in information they
voluntarily convey to third parties-a doctrine referred to as "assumption of the
247. Id.
248. See supra note 243 (citing reliance on both assumption of the risk and the tracking
beeper cases to find that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in CSLI).
249. See In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section
2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. and Historical Cell Site Info. (Alexander I), 509 F. Supp.
2d 64, 74-75 (D. Mass. 2007) (arguing that individuals who hold an expectation of privacy in
their location do not lose that expectation upon leaving that location), rev'd, 509 F. Supp. 2d 76
(D. Mass. 2007).
250. See id. ("Expecting a right to privacy in the location of where one is, or where one




risk. '252 Particularly relevant to the CSLI discussion is Smith, in which the
Court held that individuals possess neither a subjective nor a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers they dial.253 As the prior
section indicates, the application of this doctrine is crucial, as a finding of
assumption of the risk with respect to CSLI means that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to its disclosure. 4
Proponents of the probable cause standard for historical CSLI argue that
the assumption of the risk analogy is inapposite because CSLI is not
information that users convey voluntarily.255 To the contrary, CSLI is
generated through a process that occurs automatically every seven seconds
when a user's cell phone is turned on and that requires no action on the part of
the user.256 Because CSLI is conveyed without user intervention, proponents of
probable cause contend that the assumption of the risk doctrine-which
depends upon individuals voluntarily conveying information-simply does not
apply.
257
Opponents of the probable cause standard disagree, arguing that CSLI
squarely falls within the doctrine. They assert that even with the automatic
nature of the registration process, cell phone users voluntarily convey CSLI
because they voluntarily choose to use cell phones:
Just as no one forces a bank customer to do business with a financial
institution, no one forces a target to use a cell phone. It is the user's
conscious decision to activate and operate the instrument and s/he "assumes
the risk" that the service provider will turn over to law enforcement the




252. See supra Part III.B.2 (summarizing Miller and Smith and their application of the
assumption of the risk doctrine).
253. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text (describing the Smith Court's reasons
for rejecting the defendant's Fourth Amendment claim).
254. See supra notes 243, 248 and accompanying text (noting that opponents of the
probable cause standard for historical CSLI argue that there can be neither subjective nor
reasonable expectations of privacy in historical CSLI due to assumption of the risk).
255. See Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 614-15 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (arguing that assumption
of the risk does not apply to historical CSLI); In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace
Device with Cell Site Location Auth. (Smith), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756-57 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(arguing that assumption of the risk does not apply to prospective CSLI).
256. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (describing the process of
"registration").
257. See, e.g., Smith, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 756 ("Unlike dialed telephone numbers, cell site
data is not 'voluntarily conveyed' by the user to the phone company.... [I]t is transmitted
automatically during the registration process, entirely independent of the user's input.. .
258. Clark, supra note 8, at 1470-71.
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Although this argument facially rebuts the claim made by proponents of
probable cause, it ignores the fact that in today's world, the "choice" to use a
cellular telephone is really no choice at all.259 The opponents of probable cause
grossly understate the extent to which cellular communications have become a
necessity in our society. Although many individuals choose to have cell phones
for personal reasons, hoards of others are required to carry them for work,
business, and other legitimate purposes. In light of such varying motivations
for using cellular devices, it is inaccurate to proclaim that all cell phone users
are truly "voluntary" users.
More importantly, one's voluntary decision to use a cell phone cannot be
equated with a voluntary choice to convey CSLI, as CSLI is an automatic
byproduct of cell phone use of which the average user is unaware.
260
Individuals using cell phones, in other words, do not make an informed choice
to allow their providers to record information about their movements. It is no
argument to say that users remain free to turn their phones off: "[F]rom a
practical standpoint the option to turn the phone off hardly seems like an
option, as it strips the phone of its ability to receive calls., 26' Like the argument
that users may choose not to have cell phones in the first place, "[p]rotecting
oneself by not using the phone simply fails to recognize the reality of cell phone
usage in modem life.
262
3. The Tracking Beeper Cases
Through its decisions in United States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo,
the Supreme Court established that the use of a tracking device by law
enforcement officials constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment when
the device is used to track an individual's private movements, but not when it is
used only to ascertain a person's publicly-visible movements.263 In light of this
distinction, those who assert that probable cause governs the disclosure of
historical CSLI contend that CSLI has the potential to implicate private
259. See McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 441 (stating that the argument that people can
choose not to use cell phones "fails to recognize the reality of cell phone usage in modem life").
260. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Lenihan's
conclusion that the public generally is unaware of the tracking capabilities of cellular phones).
Accord McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 439 ("Many Americans may be unaware today that their
location can be tracked with their cell phones... .
261. McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 436.
262. Id. at 441.
263. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (summarizing the Fourth Amendment
implications of Knotts and Karo, when taken together).
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movements (as in Karo),264 while opponents respond that CSLI is analogous to
the public movements at issue in Knotts.265 As with assumption of the risk, the
application of the Knotts/Karo distinction to historical CSLI is essential to
determining whether the Fourth Amendment even applies to its disclosure.266
Proponents of the probable cause standard contend that historical CSLI
falls under Karo rather than Knotts because courts disclosing such data will
never be able to ensure that it reveals only the user's location and movements in
public.267 Because the practical reality is that CSPs are unable to filter their
CSLI according to the type of location it reveals,268 orders to disclose CSLI will
"almost certainly result in over-inclusive disclosures, and thus in transgressions
of Constitutional boundaries. 2 69 When the government is uncertain as to
whether its actions will invade spheres of privacy protected by Karo-an
uncertainty that it always has with respect to CSLI-its only option to avoid a
constitutional violation is to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause.27 °
In so doing, the government cannot be heard to complain that this standard
would impose upon it too great a hardship, as the Supreme Court has
proclaimed that "[t]he argument that a warrant requirement would oblige the
Government to obtain warrants in a large number of cases is hardly a
compelling argument against the requirement.,
271
Opponents of the probable cause standard for historical CSLI argue that
there is no danger that CSLI can reveal an individual's private movements in
the sense prohibited by Karo. This argument was spelled out by Judge Steams:
264. See infra notes 267-71 and accompanying text (presenting the arguments raised by
proponents of probable cause with respect to applying the tracking beeper cases to the
disclosure of historical CSLI).
265. See infra note 272 and accompanying text (presenting the argument raised by
opponents of probable cause with respect to applying the tracking beeper cases to the disclosure
of historical CSLI).
266. See supra notes 243, 248 and accompanying text (noting that opponents of the
probable cause standard for historical CSLI argue that there can be neither subjective nor
reasonable expectations of privacy in historical CSLI due to the application of the tracking
beeper cases).
267. See Lenihan, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 613 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (finding that orders granting
disclosure to CSLI "would almost certainly result in over-inclusive disclosures" under Karo).
268. See id. (suggesting that CSPs cannot filter CSLI based on location).
269. Id.
270. See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Auth. (Smith), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 757 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("Because the government cannot
demonstrate that [CSLI] could never under any circumstance implicate Fourth Amendment
privacy rights, there is no reason to treat [CSLI] differently from other forms of tracking...
which routinely require probable cause.").
271. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984).
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"The most that the 'tracked' cell phone might reveal is that its owner might
presently be found in the home. ... There is nothing, however, about that
disclosure that is any more incriminating or revealing than what could be
gleaned from... physical surveillance. 2 72 Put differently, the argument is that
historical CSLI falls under Knotts; it is information that conveys no more to law
enforcement than what they could have seen had they followed the individual's
public movements.
The problem with the view that historical CSLI is akin to the information
at issue in Knotts-a problem that is hinted at but not discussed by the
proponents of probable cause-is that it rests upon an unfounded confidence in
the imprecision of CSLI. In making their argument, opponents of the probable
cause standard implicitly assert that CSLI can never reveal an individual's
movements in places shielded from public view, for if it was possible that CSLI
could reveal such information, probable cause would be required to satisfy
Karo.273 The problem arises from the fact that CSLI-including historical
CSLI-is capable of determining a user's location to within a few hundred feet
and, in some cases, to within an even smaller radius.274 It simply is incorrect to
say that a device that pinpoints a person's location to within a few hundred feet
(or closer) never can reveal that the person has changed her location while
remaining shielded from visual surveillance. One need only consider a cell
phone user who, carrying her phone, moves from one end of her palatial private
residence to another; in such a case, CSLI would allow officers to learn about
that user's wholly private movements in a way offensive to Karo. Although
examples involving sprawling but private locations of this sort admittedly are
exceptional cases, even exceptional cases undermine the opponents' position
that CSLI never can reveal more than that which can be observed by visual
surveillance.
V. Proposed Solution: A Call to Congress
Underlying the entire debate regarding the proper standard for the
disclosure of CSLI is the elephant in the room: Congress's ongoing failure to
clear up this particularly messy area of the law. Although the statutes as they
272. In re Applications of the U.S. for Orders Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Section
2703(d) (Steams), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81 (D. Mass. 2007).
273. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (finding that a warrant is required to track an individual in
"a location not open to visual surveillance").
274. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (describing the level of precision with
which CSLI reveals users' locations).
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currently stand resolve this question in favor of probable cause, the
contentiousness of the debate and the continuing occurrence of reported cases
on the issue indicate that additional clarity is sorely needed. The government's
"hybrid" approach of piecing together cherry-picked portions of electronic
surveillance law serves as further evidence that the current statutory structure is
convoluted.
Congressional action provides the only course through which this question
can escape the labyrinth of caselaw and be resolved definitively. The issue of
what showing is required before courts may disclose users' CSLI can no longer
be written off as a novel problem that Congress has not had time to investigate
and address. The time has come for Congress to provide specific legislation
that governs and makes uniform the issuance of court orders compelling the
disclosure of CSLI.
As the previous section argues, the only way that a law can permit the
disclosure of CSLI while complying with the privacy boundaries established
under the Fourth Amendment is for it to require probable cause as to both real-
time and historical CSLI. Congress could opt to impose this probable cause
requirement through amendment of the current statutes: the SCA, the PRS, and
the CALEA. A much clearer and more effective approach, however, would be
to enact a brief but separate piece of legislation directly addressing court-
ordered CSLI disclosure. This course of action would make Congress's intent
significantly less equivocal. The following model provision would properly
address the issuance of court orders for CSLI:
(a) A court shall not grant a Government application to compel
disclosure of cell site location information, whether real-time or
historical, and shall not otherwise order disclosure of such
information, except upon a showing of probable cause as authorized
by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(b) This law shall serve as the sole authority upon which a court may
order disclosure of real-time and/or historical cell site location
information.
Enacting this specific provision would eliminate the two problems that have
plagued CSLI jurisprudence to date: the tortuous application of a series of
separate statutes and, more importantly, the failure of courts uniformly to
impose a requirement of probable cause.
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VI. Conclusion
Because courts so frequently have thwarted law enforcement attempts to
obtain real-time CSLI at a less than probable cause standard,275 it seems likely
that efforts to obtain historical CSLI will be on the rise in the coming years.
Although the government contends that there is a statutory basis for permitting
courts to compel the disclosure of historical CSLI at a reduced standard, a close
examination of this argument proves that it does not hold up to the rigors of the
statutes' application.276 More importantly, an interpretation of the applicable
electronic surveillance statutes that would allow historical CSLI to be disclosed
at a less than probable cause standard raises the specter of inevitable Fourth
Amendment violations.277 Given the absence of statutory authority for
imposing a lesser standard and the overriding Fourth Amendment default
requirement of probable cause, there is no basis for permitting the disclosure of
historical CSLI upon any showing less than probable cause.
Ultimately, requiring the government to establish probable cause to
compel the disclosure of historical cell site location information strikes the
appropriate balance between law enforcement objectives and the vital privacy
interests of American cell phone users. This was the balance reached by Judge
Smith, whose well-articulated conclusion was echoed by Judge Lenihan at the
close of her landmark historical CSLI decision:
Denial ofthe government's request for... cell site data.., should have no
dire consequences for law enforcement. This type of surveillance is
unquestionably available upon a traditional probable cause showing under
Rule 41. On the other hand, permitting surreptitious conversion of a cell
phone into a tracking device without probable cause raises serious Fourth
Amendment concerns, especially when the phone is monitored in the home
or other places where privacy is reasonably expected. Absent any sign that
Congress has squarely addressed and resolved those concerns in favor of
law enforcement, the far more prudent course is to avoid an interpretation
which risks a constitutional collision.
278
275. See supra Part III.C (discussing courts' widespread rejection of the hybrid theory with
respect to applications for real-time CSLI).
276. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing and rejecting the statutory arguments for disclosing
CSLI under the SCA's "specific and articulable facts" standard).
277. See supra Part IV.B (applying relevant Fourth Amendment principles to the
disclosure of historical CSLI and concluding that such disclosure constitutes a "search," thereby
requiring the government to show probable cause).
278. In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Auth. (Smith), 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (citations omitted).
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When the disclosure of historical CSLI is at issue, there is only one way to avert
such an inevitable constitutional collision: Imposing a requirement of probable
cause. The time has come for Congress to make this clear.

